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Concealment of Information in Consumer
Transactions in the United States, Sweden,
and China: A Window to the Relationship
Between Individualism and Regulation
By M. Neil Browne,* Justin Rex** & Curtis Bunner***

I. Introduction
When buyers and sellers interact in the marketplace, each
seeks advantage. A key element of any advantage is control over the
flow of information about the terms of the trade. Specifically, among
the relevant dimensions of the bargain are the health and safety
associated with the good or service, the quality of the good or service,
and the flow of future services to be expected from the seller should
the function of the good or service be less than desirable. The more
transparent these aspects of the prospective trade, the more likely the
buyer will be able to make a sensible decision in terms of negotiating
the trade-off between the flow of expected utility from the purchase
and the price to be paid.
Courts and legislatures express their preferences for who is to
win the allocative struggle between buyers and sellers by, inter alia,
enabling or restricting the transparency desired by prospective
buyers. This article examines the variation in that transparency in the
United States, Sweden and China. This comparison suggests the
fundamental role of individualism as a formative stimulus for the
manner in which legislatures and courts respond to consumer needs.
When consumers are viewed as responsible for their own protection,
the idea of consumer protection in this realm seems discordant with
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dominant value preferences. On the other hand, conceptualizing the
typical individual as vulnerable and lacking the time and knowledge
to navigate particular market intricacies propels empathy and
consequent legal assistance for consumers.
The struggle for fairness or for dominance in particular
market exchanges is in large part a pushing and pulling over how
much relevant information a seller is allowed to legally conceal. In
other words, if a prospective seller can reveal the attractive
components of the good or service in question, while protecting
information that would sour the prospective buyer on the purchase,
any resulting deal is premised on what must be called a
misunderstanding. The buyer believed he or she was getting one
thing, but instead received something else, a partial caricature of the
image in the consumer's mind at the time the deal was consummated.
II. The United States
The first type of concealment recognized by American courts
with regard to business transactions is concealment by actively
engaging in behavior to hide a relevant characteristic of the good or
service. For example, Bob is trying to sell his house. However,
there is a defect in the plumbing, resulting in a water-damaged ceiling
in the living room on the first floor. Before showing his home, Bob
paints over the water damage to hide the defect. Then, when asked
by potential buyers about any leaks or defects, Bob denies any
knowledge of any problems. Because Bob took an affirmative action
to cover up the water damage, and then lied about the damage, Bob is
guilty of this first type of concealment.
Most states allowing

1See, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8 spelling out the elements of a cause of action
under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. Included in the unlawful practices
governed by the Act is the knowing concealment, suppression, or omission of any
material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression or
omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or real
estate, or with the subsequent performance of such person as aforesaid, whether or
not any person has in fact been misled, deceived or damaged thereby.
One of the reasons Wright's family lost was an insufficiency of evidence to
prove their claims, including the fact that Wright's car was missing and therefore
could not be examined. However, in 2003, Wright's family found out MercedesBenz's attorneys had purchased Wright's car after the accident and hid it from all
parties involved in the initial litigation. The district court dismissed the charges,
but the appellate court reversed the lower court's decision on grounds of fraudulent
concealment. Due to the actions taken by Mercedes-Benz to hide material facts,
the court found there was substantial evidence to find Mercedes-Benz liable.
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concealment to constitute a fraudulent action require that
concealment must be of an active variety.
The second type of business concealment recognized by U. S.
courts is concealment by remaining silent on a point that could
influence the buyer's decision. 2 This second type is much more
specific, and subtle, than the first type. It includes actions such as
selling your car, but not telling the buyer the radiator has been
replaced five times in the last two years. Many consumers would not
buy a car that has had to have an important part replaced so many
times in a short period and, therefore, this information would affect
the consumer's decision. 3 Most states will acknowledge silence as

2

See, e.g., Berman v. Gurwicz, 458 A.2d 1311 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981)

(arguing a condominium seller's failure to disclose to buyers that the on-site
recreational facilities were actually separate from the condominiums and were not
included in the purchase price of the condominium constituted fraudulent
concealment through silence. The court argued the buyers would not have agreed
to the sale price had they known the recreational facilities were not included.
Therefore, the seller withheld critical information that would have directly
influenced the buyer's decision had the seller not kept the information a secret).
3 See DAVID C. COLANDER, MICROECONOMICS 38, 417-18 (5th ed. 2004).
Situations where markets do not lead to desired outcomes are considered market
failures. One specific type of market failure arises when parties have imperfect
information. That is, when one party knows something the other party does not, or
if both parties are missing significant information relevant to their transaction, a
market failure occurs.
Because the information concealed is the type of
information that would influence the party's decision, concealment is a form of the
market failure for imperfect information.
Accordingly, the legal problems arising when one party to a transaction
improperly keeps material information from the other party to the transaction is not
only a legal problem. The problem is also a market failure, and thus is a symptom
of the potentially fallacious assumptions the dominant economic system makes
about people. When states step in to attempt to curb the problem of imperfect
information, although removing the problem from the market, the state is
attempting to smooth market transactions such that Pareto optimality can be
achieved, and the state can function smoothly as well.
Political scientist Charles Lindblom further addresses the interplay between
political apparatus and market decisions when it comes to creating a functioning
society. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S
POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977). In his book, Lindblom examines various
governmental and market structures to see the various ways in which humans can,
and have, made decisions. He sees both government and the market as decisionmaking tools, as well as tools for keeping and exercising authority. Lindblom also
argues governments and markets are intricately intertwined; thus, political
decisions are market decisions, and market decisions are political decisions.
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proof of fraudulent concealment, if there is a fiduciary duty to
disclose information. 4 Although the word "concealment" is a portion
of what most, if not all, states consider fraud, not all states allow
concealment, or all kinds of concealment, to constitute proof of
fraud. 5 It appears all states allow recovery for the first type of
concealment.
This article's interest lies with the second type of

The shift from government to politics comes naturally, as politics is the
business of running day-to-day affairs, and governments are typically the structure
by which these decisions are made. However, markets also are omnipresent in
every day affairs. Therefore, as Lindblom argues, much of politics is economics,
and much of economics is politics.
Given the delicate interconnectedness of politics and markets, Lindblom
ultimately concludes, whatever system is used for decision-making, it should be
some blend of politics and markets: the only real question is what is the proper
blend for a given geographic area existing at a specific moment in time.
Lindblom's conclusion helps lend support to those states that step in to attempt to
curb some market failures, such as imperfect information. One method of
correcting imperfect information in business transactions is to allow the court to
impose liability upon parties who conceal relevant information to the detriment of
the other party. This section of this article is primarily concerned with those states
that do allow, or could allow, silence to constitute concealment in most if not all
business transactions.
4 Berman, 458 A.2d at 1313.
5 Concealment is an ambiguous word that finds itself used with multiple
meanings among the various states, and sometimes with multiple meanings within
one given state. The question is less, does a given state allow concealment to prove
fraud, but rather, what does a given state mean when it says concealment can prove
fraud.
For example, some states acknowledge a distinction between active and
constructive concealment, whereas others do not. Compare Hughes v. Glaese, 659
N.E.2d 516 (Ind. 1995) (stating that constructive concealment is when a party fails
to disclose material information to the other party, but active concealment is when
a party engages in affirmative action to hide material information from the other
party), with McGeechan v. Sherwood, 760 A.2d 1068, 1081 (Me. 2000) (stating for
a claim of concealment a party must prove, "(1) [a failure to] disclose; (2) the
material fact that the well had been abandoned due to contamination; (3) with
knowledge of the non-disclosure; [and] (4) for the purpose of inducing [the
plaintiff] to purchase the farm." Although containing specifics to the case, an
examination of the criteria reveals the general criteria includes disclosure, with no
separation made between silence and actions taken to hide information).
6 Based on a review of the case law in each state, it seems as if every state
acknowledges the ability of a party to recover damages when the party is injured
due to the active concealment of the other party. See, e.g., Shutter Shop, Inc. v.
Amersham Corp., 114 F.Supp. 2d 1218 (M.D. Ala. 2000); Laybourn v. Powell, 55
P.3d 745 (Alaska 2002); Am. Pepper Supply Co. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 93 P.3d 507
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concealment, where a seller in a transaction conceals information by
failing to disclose. Frequently the information not disclosed is
information the buyer would not even know to ask.
United States courts are dominated by the perspective that7
those who enter any market are thoughtful, calculating agents.
Hence, courts presume that consumers can generally discover or
uncover the information they need to get the goods and services they
seek. When something goes awry in the consuming process, such
consumers have failed. They had an obligation to discover what they
needed to know, and are now experiencing the logical outcome of
their mistake.
While economics as a discipline, as well as the laws it
sustains, assumes and explains that humans are rational, calculating
machines, there is abundant social science data calling into doubt

consumers' ability to form meaningful demand curves in terms of
to make decisions that
their own considered self-interest,
8 let alone

have positive community effects.

(Ariz. 2004); Davis v. Parham, 208 S.W.3d 162 (Ark. 2005); Discover Bank v.
Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
7 The law and economics perspective assumes humans are, ontological
speaking, rational agents. The American legal system is premised upon humans'
ability to rationally weigh costs and benefits, and act accordingly. Similarly,
economics is premised upon humans' ability to weigh costs and benefits, and make
all economic decision to further their own happiness based upon the cost-benefit
analysis. See ROBERT E. LANE, THE MARKET EXPERIENCE 139 (1991). Lane
compiles the evidence suggesting that as environmental complexity increases,
cognitive complexity exhibits a curvilinear relationship. See also Kurt W. Fischer
& Louise Silvem, Stages and Individual Differences in Cognitive Development, 36
ANN. REV. PSYCH, 613, 639 (1985).
See also ROBERT FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 72-74 (1999). Frank summarizes much
of the scientific evidence suggesting that the correlation between income and
happiness is extremely weak. He writes, "One of the central findings in the large
scientific literature on subjective well-being is that once income levels surpass a
minimal absolute threshold, average satisfaction levels within a given country tend
to be highly stable over time, even in the face of significant economic growth."
8 See ROBERT LANE, THE Loss OF HAPPINESS

IN MARKET DEMOCRACIES

(2000). In addition to presenting a theory of happiness inconsistent with the
economists' assumption that happiness is achieved through consumption, Lane
documents the difficulty consumers have in recalling the relevant dimensions of
their previous consumption activities.
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What such data means for the law is the ontological
assumption about human nature underlying our market system may
be flawed. Arguing through analogy, if consumers cannot rationally
create demand curves that reflect their preferences, these same people
cannot rationally evaluate every possible element of a business
transaction, especially when the seller has major profit incentives to
withhold particular bits of relevant information about the good or
service.
In summary, concealment is treated in the United States as we
would expect it to be treated. To use the law in any other fashion
would be inconsistent with the individualism that serves as the moral
core of commercial law in the U.S.

III. Sweden
The assumptions Swedish law makes about who consumers
are creates radically different governmental policies, institutions and
case law than we see in the U.S. with respect to concealment. Unlike
their American counterparts, Swedes operate within the "paradigm of
the weak consumer." Below we first outline the history and
assumptions that created this paradigm, the resulting consumer policy
prescription, and finally the laws and institutions created in its mold.

9 J.K. Johansson, The Theory and Practice of Swedish Consumer Policy 10 J.

CONSUMER AFF. 19, 20 (1976). America and Sweden (as well as their western
European counterparts) also diverge in their fundamental values. America is
characterized by an intense individualism. See EVERETT CARLL LADD, THE
AMERICAN IDEOLOGY: AN EXPLORATION OF THE ORIGINS, MEANING, AND ROLE OF

AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS (1994) (discussing the characteristic individualism of

Americans).
Ladd defines individualism as "a view of the individual person which gives
unprecedented weight to his or her choices, interests, and claims. Private property
in the economic sphere; democracy and freedom from government control in the
polity; advancement on one's merits, the absence of rank, and moral equality in the
larger society: These are the essential, distinguishing American values. All reflect
the pervasive underlying individualism."
See also ROBERT BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (3d ed. 2008).
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A. History1 °
In Sweden, as in many other Organization for Economic CoOperation and Development (OECD) countries, consumer protection
law began to develop rapidly in the 1970s. One cause for the change
in Sweden was the recognition of changing historical trends in the
economy. First was the observation that the number of products and
services available to consumers was growing rapidli. 11 This growth
was accompanied by a proliferation of advertising.' Thereafter, was
the recognition of the increasinga concentration of industry and a
decreasing amount of competition' in terms of price and quality of
goods and services. 14

10 For

a more broad historical account of trends and values in Swedish law, see

Rasmus Goksor, Jurisprudence on Protection of Weaker Parties in European
Contracts Law From a Swedish and Nordic Perspective, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 184 (2006).
Interestingly, at its outset, Swedish contract law had very similar assumptions
to current American law, which is dominated by the value of individualism.
Goksor notes that, in classical legal thought, it was assumed that "all contracting
parties had equal social and economic power and, therefore, that parties could look
after their own interests. The widespread use of the caveat emptor principle
strengthened the presumption that contracting parties were informed and rational
early 2 0 th
actors." Over time, however, these assumptions were replaced. In the
century, Sweden gradually began to develop into a welfare state.
11Ulf Bernitz, Consumer Protection: Aims, Methods, and Trends in Swedish
Consumer Law, 52 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. IN L. 13-36 (1976).
12 Id. at 14.
13 The term "competition" is a technical one used by economists to denote a
specific type of market structure. Several assumptions must be met for a market
system to be beneficial to consumers. See COLANDER, supra note 3; M. Niel
Browne, Carrie Williamson & Garrett Coyle, The Shared Assumptions of the Jury
System and the Market System 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425 (2006). If the number of
firms is large and there are no barriers to entry into a market, profit hungry firms
will freely enter a market where existing firms are selling low quality products or
charging high prices, sell a better product at a lower price, and drive out other
firms, all to the benefit of consumers, who will buy better products cheaper.
See also JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, AMERICA CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF

COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952). The American heterodox economist documents
the changes in the structure of the economy and its implications for competitive
theory.
14 Bemitz, supra note 11, at 14.

2008]

Consumer Transactions

B. Assumptions
These historical changes stimulated changes in how Swedes
tend to view consumers and their power in the economy. Swedes see
firms as having a disproportionate amount of power compared to
consumers. 15 Sweden's National Board for Consumer Policy states
that, "the individual consumer occupies a weak position relative to
producers, distributors, and marketers." 16
The website of the Swedish Consumer Agency, the main
government body working on behalf of consumers, discussed infra,
expresses similar views: it acknowledges the "inherent imbalance
between businessmen and consumers in the market-place" and the
ability of businessmen to "use their superior bargaining power" to
manipulate the consumer in an unfair way. 17
This weakness stems largely from the historical trends just
discussed.
The Swedish assume consumers can be easily
manipulated by increasingly sophisticated advertising18 19, that the

15Johansson,

supra note 9, at 20.

16 Id.

17 The Swedish Consumer Agency, Market Law in Sweden, Sept. 9, 2007,

http://www.konsumentverket.se/mallar/en/artikel.asp?lngCategoryld=665;
see
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY (1958). Economists assume
that in a competitive market, consumers are sovereign. See Browne et al., supra
note 13. That is that consumers have power and it is firms that are weak and need
to bend to the will of consumer demand.
18Galbraith writes that part of producer sovereignty is the ability of firms to
manipulate consumer preferences.
He is in the minority of economists.
Economists assume that preferences are not shaped by firms or by society, but,
rather that they are stable, given and brought to the market uninfluenced by external
factors. See COLANDER, supra note 12, at 200; Gary Becker & George Stigler, De
Gustibus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977). They argue that "it
is neither necessary nor useful to attribute to advertising the function of changing
tastes" because consumers are sovereign (quoted in ROBERT KUTTNER,
EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS OF MARKETS 44 (1996). If this
assumption is not correct, economic theory suffers a setback because demand
curves no longer reflect true consumer desires and instead reflect artificial ones.
For a refutation of the assumption of stable preferences see the work in
behavioral economics by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky on the concepts of
"loss aversion" and the "endowment effect." Research suggests that our desired
price for a good changes when we are buying it as compared to when we are selling
the same item after having owned it. Humans have an aversion to loss and after
having been endowed a good, they will try to sell it for a higher price than if they
were offering to buy the good having never owned it. If the research is valid,
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growing number of products restricts the possibility of rational

consumer choices because of a "scarcity of time, income, and
generally limited resources, '

2°

and that with decreasing competition

and increasing market concentration consumers are at risk of injury
from harmful products. 2 1

An additional assumption is that "there

exist large groups of consumers who, owing to low incomes,
deficient education and knowledge of the market etc., are less well
' 22
equipped than the average citizen for their role as consumers."

consumer preferences are not stable and instead shift depending on our point of
reference to a good. For a discussion of their work, see BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE
PARADOX OF CHOICE (2004).
19 Sweden is particularly concerned with advertising's ability to influence
children. See Gunilla Jarlbro, Children and Television Advertising, Jan., 2001,
http://www.konsumentverket.se/mallar/en/listaartiklar.asp?lngCategoryd=662;
Erling Bjurstrom, Children and Television Advertising, Oct., 1994,
http://www.konsumentverket.se/mallar/en/lista-artiklar.asp?lngCategoryld=662.
Sweden has an outright ban on any advertising aimed at children below the age
of twelve and bans any advertising during the hours children are most likely to be
watching television.
Evidence suggests that children are particularly susceptible to manipulation by
advertising. See Janice H. Kang, Barbie Banished from the Small Screen: The
ProposedEuropean Ban on Children's Television Advertising, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 543 (2001). Kang cites studies that found that children are much more likely
than adults to believe advertisements (children do not develop the capacity to begin
doubting them until around age twelve) and found that children who are shown
advertisements for a new product changed their established preferences.
20 Johansson, supra note 9, at 20.
21

Bemitz, supra note 11, at 26.

22

Id. at 14.

Almost all economists would disagree with this depiction of the reasoning
ability of consumers. They assume all humans behave according to rational selfinterest. In a perfectly competitive market, consumers have perfect information
about goods and services and rationally assess this information to develop a rank
order of that which will give them the most marginal utility. So, consumers know
the quality and price of a product as well as the amount of marginal pleasure it will
provide (as well as this information for the next best alternative) and can therefore
weigh alternatives according to expected utility and make rational choices, which
will maximize their utility.
Much of the research in behavioral economics refutes that humans always
behave rationally and make choices that maximize utility. For a compendium of
much of the research done in this field, see RICHARD THALER, THE WINNER'S
CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE (1992).
For another
useful trove of psychological evidence that humans are not always rational, see
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Thus, unlike in the U.S., the Swedish legislature and courts see
consumers as inevitably lacking some of the resources and skills
necessary to exert power that would counterbalance that of producers.
C. General Policy Prescription
If consumers lack power and resources to protect their own
interests in the marketplace, who shoulders responsibility for insuring
that their interests are protected? In Sweden, as well as the other
Scandinavian countries, responsibility for consumer protection is
largely the duty of the state. Sweden's Consumer Agency believes
that the:
[C]onsumer should receive support and be given a strong
position in the market. Mandatory legal rules and direct
interventions form an important basis to support the
consumer. The consumer legislation is, to a large extent,
intended
to prevent problems affecting the consumers as a
24
group.

Together the state and consumer can balance the power exerted by
businesses. 25

supra note 18. Behavioral economics tests economists' predictions of
how rational individuals will behave in given situations and the results often prove
the predictions.
23 Bernitz, supra note 11, at 26.
SCHWARTZ,

24

Market Law in Sweden, supra note 17.

25

For a detailed account of the governing bodies established in Sweden that

work on behalf of the consumer, see The Swedish Consumer Agency,,
http://www.konsumentverket.se/. See also Bernitz, supra note 11; J.J. Boddewyn,
The Swedish Consumer Ombudsman System and Advertising Self-Regulation, 19 J.
OF CONSUMER AFF. 140 (1985); Johansson, supra note 9. We provide a brief
overview of the major institutions below.
The Consumer Agency, "Konsumentverket", and the Consumer Ombudsman,
"Konsumentombudsmannen" (KO), function together as the main institution for
consumer protection. The Consumer Agency is responsible for conducting talks
with trade and industry associations as well as businesses to develop policy, settle
disputes and push for industry self regulation. It has the authority to issue general
guidelines and regulations concerning consumer policy.
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26

Given the assumptions and view of the state's role in
protecting consumers, what has Sweden actually done to protect
consumers? The first major piece of legislation is the Marketing Act.
It was passed in 1970 and updated in 1975 and 1996. As section one
of the act states, "The object of this Act is to promote the interests of
consumers and of trade and industry in connection with the marketing
of products and to counteract marketing that is unfair to consumers
and businessmen." 2 7 This act was created to insure fair marketing
practices, which includes "advertisements and other measures taken
in the course of business intended to promote sales and availability of
products. 2 8 The act gives power to various government bodies to
enforce
these provisions through legal action and fines, discussed
29
infra.
The act has requirements for what advertising must include,
ordering that "[iut shall also be clearly indicated who is responsible
for the marketing.' 30 But mainly the Act includes provisions for
what businesses cannot include, as well as restrictions on the
information included. For example, when marketing a product, a
businessperson may not make claims or other statements that are
misleading with respect to the businessman's own or another
businessman's business operations.
This restriction applies especially to statements relating to the
following:
1. nature, quantity, quality or other properties of the
product;
2. origin, use and environmental and health effects of the
product;

26

The sources documenting these aspects in Sweden are many. See generally

The Swedish Consumer Agency, http://www.konsumentverket.se/; Boddewyn,
supra note 25; Bernitz, supra note 11; Johansson, supra note 9.
27 Marknadsfdringslagen
(Svensk
fc6rfattningssamling
[SFS] 1995:450)
(Swed.), translatedin The Marketing Act (2004), available at http://www.sweden.
gov.se/content/1 /c6/05/03/14/b02d0909.pdf.
28 § 3 Marknadsf6ringslagen (SFS 1995:450).
29

1d. §§ 14-57.

3 Id. § 5.
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3. product's price, basis of pricing and conditions for
payment;
4. businessman's
own
or
another
businessman's
qualifications, market position, distinguishing marks and
other rights; and
31
5. prices and awards given to the businessman.

In addition, when marketing the good or service, a
businessperson may not use packages that, because of their size or
external design, generally are misleading as regards the quantity, size
or form of the product.3 2 The businessperson may not use misleading
imitations because they can easily be confused for another
businessperson's known and characteristic products.3 3
A
businessperson may, in his advertisement, directly or indirectly,
identify another businessman or businessmen's products under the
following conditions:
1. only if the comparison is not misleading;
2. relates to products that correspond to the same need or
are intended for the same purpose;
3. mentions in an objective manner substantially, relevant,
verifiable and characteristic properties of the products;
4. does not involve confusion between the businessperson
and another businessperson or between their products,
trademarks, business names or other characteristic signs;
5. does not discredit nor is derogatory of another
businessman's
operations,
circumstances,
products,
trademarks, business name or other characteristic signs;
6. does not take unfair advantage of the reputation of
another
businessman's trademark, business name or
characteristic sign or the designation of origin of the goods;
and

31
32

1d. § 6.
Id. § 7.

33 § 8 Marknadsfdringslagen (SFS 1995:450).
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7. does not present a product as an imitation or copy of a
product that has a protected trademark or business name.
The second major piece of consumer protection legislation is
the Product Safety Act. Its objective is to "ensure that goods and
services that are provided to consumers do not cause personal
injury.", 34 The Act outlines criteria for what makes a product safe,
but of particular importance here is the information the tradesman
must supply to the consumer.
A manufacturer who supplies goods or a tradesman who
provides a service shall provide such safety information as is
necessary for a consumer to be able to assess the risks of the goods or
service and protect himself against these risks. Any manufacturer
who has supplied dangerous goods or tradesman who has provided a
dangerous service shall without delay provide information about the
risk of injury and how it can be avoided, if it is necessary to prevent
the occurrence of an accident. The information shall be provided to
the persons possessing the goods or for whom the service has been
performed or who possess the property to which the service refers.
The information shall be provided in such a way that it may
be assumed to come to the knowledge of the relevant persons,
through direct notifications, advertisements or other presentations
that the tradesman uses in his marketing. The information shall be
provided to the extent that is reasonably necessary to prevent the
occurrence of an accident. As with the Marketing Act, this Act also
gives power to government agencies that can act on behalf of
consumers to sanction businesses that do not follow its provisions 35
Sweden also has several other consumer protection laws
regulating more narrow areas of possible concealment. The
Consumer Credit Act "guarantee[s] that the consumer will be
informed of the true cost of buying on credit, whether the credit is in
the form of a bank loan, installment payments or credit on account.
The consumer must be able to compare alternative forms of credit
and compare credit to cash payment." 36 The Price Information Act
"stipulates that consumers must be provided with clear and correct
price information for goods and services, including those in shop

34 § 1 Produktsakerhetslag (Svensk f6rfattningssamling [SFS] 2004:451)
(Swed.),
translated in Product Safety
Act, (2004), available at
http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2016/a/33449.
35 §§ 24-45 Produktsakerhetslag (SFS 2004:45 1).
36

Market Law in Sweden, supra note 17.

Consumer Transactions

2008]

windows." 3 7 In addition, according to the Distant Sales and Door-toDoor Sales Act, "the seller must inform the consumer of this right
when the
goods are being marketed and when the sales agreement is
38
made."
Compared to the American reaction to concealment in market
transactions, Sweden is aggressively committed to protecting
consumers. By contrast, United States law assumes that consumers
either can or should be able to protect themselves adequately in
situations when the seller simply does not divulge relevant
characteristics of the good or service. Either of these perspectives
makes sense dependant on the assumptions citizens make about the
intellectual and calculative power of one another. The key question,
consequently, is "what is reasonable to assume that a buyer should be
able to discover about a good or service prior to purchase?"

IV. China
The window to Chinese attitudes about the proper boundaries
of concealment is their legal system's response to claims made by
advertisers. China, the world's third largest advertising economy, 39 is
expected to pass Japan to become the second largest advertising
economy in the next seven to ten years.40
Although a major
economic power, China is relatively new to Western-style
advertising, and Chinese advertising law has only a few decades of
evolutionary history. 4 1 Consequently, China is in a unique position
of possessing a significant market for advertisers worldwide, but with
little experience regulating advertisements.
The history of Chinese advertising law demonstrates the
magnitude of change advertising law has undergone in China since

37 Market Law in Sweden, supra note 17.
38

Id.

39 Geoffrey A. Fowler, Agencies Find China Land of Opportunity and
Unhappy Clients, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2006, at B I.
40 Ad Note, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2005, at B4.
41 The first modem law in China concerning advertising was the Provisional
Regulations on the Administration of Advertising of 1982, followed by the
Regulation on the Control over Advertisements, adopted by the State Council in
1987. This document was later replaced by the Advertisement Law of the People's
Republic of China, adopted by the Standing Committee of the Eighth National
People's Congress in 1994.
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the first such law passed in 1982.
The most recently enacted
Chinese advertising law incorporates much of the content of the
previous two laws, and expands the scope of the law to include issues
of access to information regarding advertised products, the inclusion
of data and statistical information in advertisements, competition,
medical advertisements, and consumer protection.43
This law
provides the most direct avenue for making a comparison with U.S.
and Swedish attitudes toward the proper boundaries of concealment
in market exchanges.
Of particular interest are the striking ideological differences
between American and Chinese advertising laws resulting from the
heavy influence of Chinese culture and ideology. China's 1994
advertising law states as its purpose: "to protect the legitimate rights
and interests of consumers, maintain the socioeconomic order, and
enable advertisements to play a positive role in the socialist market
economy. 44 Such a statement by itself tells us little about how such
broad abstractions guide behavior in the marketplace.
The Chinese view consumer protection as a human right that
would supersede any freedom of speech arguments. Freedom of
speech as a right provides muscle for legitimizing the practice of
advertising in the United States.
The "maintenance of the
socioeconomic order" 45 has no similar counterpart in American law,
42 Zhihong Gao, The Evolution of Chinese Advertising Law: A Historical

Review,

8

ADVERTISING

&

SoC'Y

REV.(2007),

http://muse.jhu.edul

joumals/asr/v008/8. Igao.html.
Gao claims that the development of Chinese advertising law "in the last two

decades closely mirrors the contradictions embedded in the Chinese society in its
transition from an underdeveloped socialist state to a market economy paired with
authoritarian politics." Ideologically, according to Gao, China is influenced
primarily by three systems of thought: Marxism-Leninism, liberalism, and
Confucianism. "Confucianism has become "the residual," socialism "the selective
tradition," and capitalism "the emergent," element of Chinese culture.
After the Mao regime's antagonism towards capitalism had faded, China began
experimenting with market-oriented approaches in the 1970's. The country has
since developed into (according to the official Chinese position) a "socialist market
economy" that in actuality, according to Gao, is "essentially quasi-capitalist in
nature."
43 Advertisement Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's
Cong., Oct. 27, 1994, effective Feb. 1, 1995) (P.R.C), translation available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383782.htm.
44 Id.

45 Id.
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and is indicative of the roots of Chinese advertising law. Chinese law
contains the mandate for advertising "to play a positive role in the
socialist market economy., 46 In the U.S. context such a statement of
expectations, minus the rhetoric about socialism, would refer to the
maximization of individual rights in market transactions. But in
China, the same phrases represent recognition that the community is
an organism apart from the aggregation of individual desires.
The Advertisement Law is comprehensive, incorporating all
aspects of Chinese advertising law, but lacks any clause pertaining to
Internet advertising regulation47 , an omission with increasingly
significant ramifications. 48 The law defines 'advertisements' in a
manner 49 that would, prima facie, seem to include Internet-related
advertisements, but has yet to be implemented as such.5°
The Advertisement Law contains powerful standards with
regard to the truthfulness of advertising claims, significantly more so

46

Id.

47 Xiaohu Ma, China's Regulation of the Internet and Related Legal Issues,
(2000), http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update244.html.

Ma and Deng note that the Advertisement Law of China was promulgated
before the introduction (or at least mainstream adoption) of the Internet in China.
Advertisers are required under the law to obtain an advertising license and issue
invoices to advertising clients (which can only be issued by licensed advertisers).
Internet Content Providers (e.g. YouTube) should theoretically be licensed and
issue invoices to clients, but a majority of domestic Internet Content Providers are
currently not required to do so. Ma and Deng reference the prediction by "Chinese
legal experts" that a new set of internet advertising regulations will be introduced
soon, but this remains unclear.
48 Will Knight, Google MirrorBeats Great Firewallof China, NEW SCIENTIST
ONLINE, Sept.6 2002, http://www.newscientist.com!article/dn2768-google-mirrorbeats-great-firewall-of-china.html.
Google has been blocked inside China since the 1st of September 2002, along
with several other websites, including the BBC website and other search engines.
Although no legislation exists in China regarding the blocking of internet websites,
the national government has made it a policy to restrict internet access to certain
websites from other countries as well as domestically-hosted websites.
49 Advertisement Law (P.R.C.), art. 2.
"The "advertisements" as used in this Law refer to commercial advertisements,
for which a commodity producer or dealer or service provider pays, and by which
the same, through certain media or forms, directly or indirectly introduces his
commodities to be sold or services to be provided."
50 Ma & Deng, supra note 47.
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than American standards. 5 ' Of particular note is the requirement of
an advertisement to comply "with the requirements for socialist
cultural and ideological development." Americans might take for
granted the individualistic theme of advertising in the U.S., but in
China the themes, expressions, and possible interpretations from
within the Chinese cultural context are quite different.
In another example of the differences between Chinese and
American advertising norms, Article 7 reasserts the importance of
A more
consumer protection, social stability, and State interests.

protection can be found in
comprehensive explication of consumer
53
the revised Product Quality Law.
51

Advertisement Law (P.R.C.), art. 3.

"Article 3: An advertisement shall be factually true, lawful and in compliance with
the requirements for socialist cultural and ideological development. Article 4: An
advertisement shall not contain any false information, and shall not cheat or
mislead consumers. Article 5: ... and adhere to the principles of fairness, honesty,
and credibility."
52

Id. art. 7.
"Article 7: The contents of an advertisement shall be conducive to the
physical and mental health of the people, shall promote the quality of
commodities and services, protect the legitimate rights and interests of
consumers, be in compliance with social morality and professional
ethics, and safeguard the dignity and interests of the State."

53 Product Quality Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's

Cong., Feb. 22, 1994, effective Sep. 1, 1993) (P.R.C.), translation available at
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383813.htm.
An official purpose of the Product Quality Law is "protecting the legitimate
rights and interests of consumers and safeguarding the socio-economic order."
This has no analog in American law, and as such provides a unique insight into the
structure of the Chinese advertising system. "Consumers have the right to make
inquiries to producers and sellers about the product quality; and to make complaints
to the supervisory departments for product quality, the administrative departments
for industry and commerce and relevant departments. The departments which
accept the complaints shall be responsible for handling."
The Chinese have taken a proactive approach to consumer protection with the
Product Quality Law. Rather than requiring that individual consumers take action
against corporations individually or through class action suits, China has designed a
governmental system to handle product quality assurance and consumer rights.
The legal system of the U.S. assumes the consumer to have access to perfect (or
near perfect) access to information, to be rational, and be able to leverage the
necessary legal force to obtain compensation for faulty/harmful products from the
producer.
China does not share this assumption of the rational, perfectly informed consumer.

2008]

Consumer Transactions

287

Perhaps one of the more surprising aspects of advertising in
China for foreign companies is the extent to which Chinese
traditional custom and communitarian values shape the Chinese
public's acceptance/rejection of advertisements. The role of the
national government in regulating advertisements is quite often
augmented by public outcry at foreign advertisements that fail to
correctly compensate for Chinese culture norms. Many foreign
companies have been forced to pull advertisements and even their
products from Chinese markets as a result of insensitive
advertising.5 4
However, even when foreign companies take extra
precautions to attempt to adapt their commercials to the Chinese
culture by naming products after Chinese icons or incorporating
aspects of Chinese tradition into advertisements, bridging the cultural
gap remains insurmountable.5 5
Instead, Chinese law is structured to provide protection of its citizens based on the
very different assumptions that people are not rational all the time, have limited
access to product quality information, and rarely possess the financial assets
necessary to fund a lawsuit against a major corporation.
54Brian Walsh, Mixed Messages, TIME MAGAZINE, Asia ed., Nov. 4, 2002,
available
at
advertising.html.

http://www.time.com/time/asia/features/china-cul-rev/

Pizza Hut tried to run a TV commercial in China, adapting a U.S.
advertisement for Chinese audiences by using Chinese actors. The commercial
featured a classroom of children reporting on the activities of their weekends, with
the last student getting so excited recounting his trip to Pizza Hut that he climbed
on top of his desk. While such an advertisement would face no cultural or legal
obstacles in the U.S., the commercial was prevented from airing by the Chinese
Advertising Association (CAA) - the government agency that determines what
commercials are allowed to air
because the censors "thought the end was
impolite." Pizza Hut ran the ad with modifications: sans delinquent behavior.
Yahoo was able to sidestep the cultural taboo of overt individualism in a TV
commercial, which aired on Chinese TV. The commercial featured a mailman
performing his regular duties while doing a 'funky dance.' He is arrested for his
behavior, but is saved from being locked up in a Beijing mental ward by the ad's
ending that reveals that the mailman is a part of a funky dancing team. "It's about
being kooky, but being kooky in a group."
55Fengru

Li

&

Nader

H.

Shooshtari, Multinational Corporations'
ControversialAd Campaigns in China, 8 ADVERTISING & Soc'Y REV. (2007),
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/asr/v008/8.1 li_shooshtari.html.
Toyota ran a TV advertisement in China for their new 2004 SUV, "Prado."
Two Chinese characters, -00, (pronounced as ba dao) were chosen because of
their masculine sounding phonetic appeal. The literal translation of ba dao is
"taking the road in one's own hand." The contextual meaning, can be "the mighty

Loyola Consumer Law Review

288

[Vol. 20:3

The Advertisement Law itself provides a somewhat mixed set

of restrictions regarding what kinds of claims can and cannot be
made in advertisements. U.S. advertising laws are silent on many of
the issues covered by provisions of the Chinese Advertisement Law
on the grounds that such issues are matters for negotiations between
buyers and sellers. 5 6 Even the inclusion of prominent government

officials in an advertisement can be grounds for banning an
advertisement. 57

The combination of sometimes-vague advertising

rule," "rule by force," "tyranny," and "overbearing." The advertisement showed
two Chinese stone lions bowing and saluting to the Toyota SUV with the headline
translated into "ba dao [The rule by force], you cannot but
of
,
respect." The contextual translation of the headline can be interpreted in three
ways:
"You can't help but be ruled by Prado's power,"
"The Prado's power will take you over," or
"You have to admire and respect Prado's supreme quality."
The faux pas did not only carry with it the problem of an arrogant-sounding
translation, but also the historical baggage of Chinese-Japanese relations. The
Chinese lions (symbols of power and Chinese national pride) bowing and saluting
to a conquering Japanese manufactured vehicle elicited ugly reminders of the
Second Sino-Japanese War and the Nanking Massacre.
Nike ran an advertisement that was banned due to public outcry, despite the
numerous cultural motifs and inclusions of Chinese icons. The spot featured
American NBA player LeBron James defeating an elderly Chinese martial arts
master, a pair of dragons, and two legendary Chinese goddesses in a simulated
videogame. Nike aired the commercial through the China Central Television
Station (CCTV) of Beijing, which immediately resulted in debates on Chinese
Internet sites. On December 3, 2004, China's State Administration for Radio, Film
and Television banned Nike's commercial stating that the commercial "violates
regulations that mandate that all advertisements in China should uphold national
dignity and interest and respect the motherland's culture."
56 Advertisement Law, art. 7.
"An advertisement shall not employ or do any of the following things:
1. Use the National Flag, the National Emblem or the National
Anthem of the People's Republic of China;
2. Use terms such as "State level," the "highest grade" or "the
best";
3. Hinder public order or violate sound social morals;
4. Contain information suggesting pornography, superstition,
terror, violence or hideousness;
5. Hinder the protection of environment or natural resources"
57 Advertisers Warned Against Using Chinese Officials to Promote Products,
People's Daily, Sep. 8, 2006, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/ 200609/07/
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restrictions with a strong central Chinese authority creates an
advertising environment of heavy restriction and censorship.
However, such a system also provides for a great deal more consumer
protection than the more liberal American advertising environment,
exemplifying the drastic difference in cultural and legal value
systems.
Another aspect of China's Advertisement Law that differs
significantly from its American counterparts is the requirement for
advertisers to provide consumers with all relevant information
regarding a product. 58 This approach to informing prospective
buyers is quite different from that found in the U.S. Rather than the
default of limited access to information (save individual inquiries
from consumers or lawsuits for further information) as is found in
American advertisements, Chinese law specifically outlines the legal
requirement for advertisers to include all relevant information.
Advertisers are also required to cite their sources for statistical data,5 9
a requirement notoriously absent from American advertising laws.
This requirement marks a significant departure from American policy
because it bars unsupported claims in advertising, even excluding
"studies show" as inappropriate.
In yet another striking difference from the American
competitive advertising system, direct competition in advertising is
forbidden. 60 However, it is unclear from the text of the Chinese
eng20060907_300595.html.
"It is illegal, as per the Advertisement Law to use representations of the
words and images of government leaders being used for commercial
promotions. ... The inspection will focus on shopping malls, franchise
houses and restaurants that may display words and photos of
government officials to underline the credibility of their products and
possibly mislead their customers. ... Illegal representations would
result in prosecution, said the official."
58 Advertisement Law, art. 9.
"Article 9: Where there are statements in an advertisement concerning
the performance, place of origin, use, quality, price, producer or
manufacturer, term of validity and promise of a commodity, or

concerning the items, forms, quality, price and promise of a service,
they shall be clear and explicit."
59 Advertisement Law, art. 10.
"Article 10: Data, statistical information, results of an investigation or
survey, digests and quotations used in an advertisement shall be true to
the facts and accurate, and their sources shall be indicated."
60 Advertisement Law, art. 12.
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Advertisement Law to what extent this restriction on competition
through advertising applies. The vague nature of this no-competition
clause leaves much unanswered in terms of the allowable types of
comparisons among similar products.
Where Chinese advertising law might lack clarity in nocompetition regulations compared to U.S. laws, it is aggressively
protective of consumer interests with respect to medical
advertisements. 6' While American medical ads are fraught with
unsupported claims, ambiguous references to "a recent study," and "9
out of 10 doctors recommend," Chinese advertising law requires that
advertisements include detailed, accurate, and scientifically sound
information regarding medical products. Chinese laws additionally
require that no rates of measured efficacy of medicines are included
that might mislead consumers of the possibility of a cure.
Of particular note is the restriction that no images of medical
research institutions, academic organizations, experts, doctors, or
patients can be used in advertisements. It would be rare indeed to
find a single American medical advertisement that would meet such a
requirement, as personal testimony and authority figures of doctors
and medical researchers constitute much of the credibility of
American medical advertisements. Chinese advertisers who violate
this provision face license revocations. 62

"Article 12: An advertisement shall not belittle the commodities of
other producers and dealers or the services of other providers."
61 Advertisement Law, art. 14.
"Article 14: An advertisement for pharmaceuticals and medical
equipment and instruments shall not include the following:

1. Unscientific affirmations or guarantees of efficacy;
2. Indications of rates of cure or efficacy;
3. A comparison of efficacy and safety with those of other
pharmaceuticals or medical equipment and instruments;

62

Daily

4. Using the name or image of a medical research institution,
academic organization, medical institution or of an expert, a
doctor or a patient as proof;"
China to Ban Products of Firms Posting "Illegal" Medical ads, China
Online,

Sept.

4,

2007,

http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2007-

04/15/content_850743.htm.
The (Chinese) State Food and Drug Administration (SDFA) asked its local
administrators to ban the products of medical companies found to post illegal

advertisements.
Serious offenders will also be stripped of their advertisement licenses for one
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Illustrative of the Chinese antagonism to concealment in
63
advertising is their strong stand against tobacco consumption.
China's position with respect to tobacco is counter-intuitive from a
private profit perspective. China is the world's largest producer of
tobacco.
Yet, the law's insistence that advertising claims be
complete and true is a practical application of its identification of
consumer protection as a foundational step toward social welfare.
Yet another example of China's commitment to stymieing
efforts by sellers to conceal relevant product information is the legal
restriction on advertisements for breast milk substitutes.6 4 This
concern for public safety trumps the kinds of freedom of expression
arguments that often hold sway in American discourse about
regulation of advertising.
Consequently, restrictions against

year, said an official with the SFDA. "Some medical manufacturers and retailers
violate China's advertising law by providing false information or exaggerating the
benefits of their products,"' the SFDA official said. Some also misled customers
with endorsements by self-appointed experts, he said. In March, the SFDA
blacklisted seven particularly egregious offenders who continue to post illegal
advertisements despite being punished last year. A survey by the SFDA of 466
newspapers and 55 local TV stations from January to November last year
uncovered 48,990 illegal advertisements for drug products. China to Ban Products
of Firms Posting "Illegal" Medical Ads, China Court, Apr. 19, 2007,
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=4174.
63 Press Release, World Health Organization, China joins the global war on
smoking
(2005),
available at
http://www.wpro.who.int/mediacentre/
pressreleases/pr 20050830.htm.
"China, the world's largest consumer and producer of tobacco, has
ratified an international treaty aimed at curbing tobacco-related
diseases and deaths. The World Health Organization Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) was ratified on Sunday
by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, Chinese
state media reported."
64 Vivien Cui, Curbs Urged on Baby Formula Advertising, SOUTH CHINA
MORNING POST, JUL.

24, 2004, News at 6.

"The mainland should step up enforcement of a ban on advertising and
marketing of breast milk substitutes, a Ministry of Health official has
said. Commercials using sophisticated advertising techniques were
often aired on television to promote breast milk substitutes. The
regulations ban the advertising of formula milk for babies younger than
six months of age - a period during which the World Health
Organization considers a child should only be fed on breast milk. But
one Health Ministry official said yesterday manufacturers, especially
foreign firms, were still targeting their marketing at parents of younger
infants, without explicitly breaking the rules."
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concealment in advertising for medical products are increasingly
protective of consumers. 65 When American advertisers attempt in
China to use the same persuasive techniques that they use in
American advertisements, they often learn the hard way about
the
66
relatively strong stance the Chinese take against concealment.

V. Conclusion
When we think of the typical buyer, whom do we envision? Is
the consumer the rational actor who understands his or her consistent
preferences and can make the calculations about the merits and
demerits of alternative purchases on a regular basis? Alternatively, is
the consumer often unable to make such decisions on his own behalf
because the information needed to make those calculations is
incomplete or misleading? Is the consumer an icon of personal
responsibility in action or a vulnerable seeker requiring legal
assistance if he or she is to register accurate preferences among goods
and services?
The answers to these questions are doubtlessly shaped by
cultural norms, introspection and observations reflecting almost
certainly a very poor sample of the population of consumers.
Concealment in the United States is often shielded from regulation by
arguments tied to the free speech of the seller and the prescriptive
65

China Proposes New Advertising Regulations to Bad Adverts for Fake

Products, China Economic Net, Mar. 22, 2006, http://en.ce.cn/Industries/
Consumen-Industries/200603/22/t20060322_645544 l.shtml.
"Medical advertisements about hospitals and medicines are flooding
the Chinese media. A government figure says that about 2.5 million
Chinese took the wrong medication because of misleading advertising.
Luo Yifeng, a leader figure in Beijing Chemical Industry Group
Corporation, proposed to set up the Advertising Law on Public Interest
to secure enough time for more useful adverts to be shown on TV.
"The public service ads could effectively influence the audience,
especially at a time when the country is looking to build a harmonious
society," said Luo.
66 P&G (China) Again Faces False Advertising Claims, China Daily, June 29,
2005, available at
3150261.htm.

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-06/29/content_

Four Proctor & Gamble (P&G) advertisements were challenged by the
Commercial Bureau over exaggerated advertising claims, including the
advertisement indicating that "Pantene V shampoo makes hair ten times more
resilient than normal" and the SK-II de-wrinkle cream advertisement claiming to be
able to "make one 12 years younger."
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expectation that consumers should work to unveil the information
they need.67 Swedish and Chinese law, on the other hand, focuses on
the vulnerability of buyers to faulty decisions in market transactions.
In the interest of public health and safety, as well as a desire for
market transactions to transpire in an atmosphere of abundant,
accurate product information, Sweden and China inhibit concealment
to a degree almost inconceivable in the United States.

67

Dan Dobbs, THE LAW OF TORTS, at 348 (West 2001).

